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CORPORATIONS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
L

MAURICE WORMSERt

"Northampton, Mass., May 2.--Those who are engaged in the practice of
law have before them two problems so serious as almost to menace the future
existence of the profession. One is the carrying on of law business by unauthorized persons and corporations. Associations undertake to protect the
legal rights of members, and all kinds of persons prepare legal papers. Where
this is not prohibited by statute, apparently it can be enjoined by the courts.']L
These words, appearing in the public press on May 4, 1931, indicate
that Calvin Coolidge, an exceptionally acute and level-headed observer,
realized that a social question of serious portent is presented by the inroads of corporations in recent years upon a territory which the lawyer
always has claimed as his exclusive and licit domain. This, although
almost half the states prohibit, in orthodox fashion, the practice of law
by corporate entities.' A glance at the facts instantly reveals that theor
is one thing and practice another.3 While in theory corporations are
forbidden to engage in the practice of the law,4 no fair-minded observer
can deny that they do so, and that this tendency is increasing, and that
the layman (as distinguished from the lawyer) apparently approves
of it.5
For many years certain occupations have been recognized as so-called
"learned professions". Law, medicine, and dentistry are outstanding
illustrations. Skill and proficiency in them require long years of special
study and training. The State, as a rule, has recognized the general
public interest in these professions and protects them, so far as prac- Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Lav.%
1. N. Y. Herald Tribune, May 4, 1931, at 1.
2. ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 32, §§ 411-415; Af.ss. Gras. Lvws (1921) c.
221, § 46; N. Y. PmT LAw (1934) § 280; N. Y. Civ. PRc. Act. § 1221-a, added by Laws
1935, c. 387.
3. Wo=Ens,, FRAfiI-xEm INCOROmAT
(1931) 178-179.
4. 44 N. Y. STATE BAR ASS'x REPORTS 297 (1921); Bundick, The Corporate Practice
of Law (1931) 37 CASE AND CoarNT 7.
5. Comment (1931) 44 HAxv. L. REv. 1114-1115.
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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

ticable, against debasement by maintaining certain standards of training, education and ethics.6 "A corporation, as such" said Evans, J.,
rather recently, "has neither education nor skill nor ethics." These are
sine qua non to a learned profession.
In 1901 a corporation was organized for the avowed purpose of engaging in the practice of the law, by means of a staff of lawyers. The
Court of Appeals of New York held that a corporation could not be
lawfully organized to practice law, under a statute providing that "three
or more persons may become a stock corporation for any lawful business." 8 The gist of the opinion, written by Vann, J., was that the
legislature did not thereby intend to include the work of the learned
professions. The court said:
"The practice of law is not a business open to all, but a personal right,
limited to a few persons of good moral character, with special qualifications
ascertained and certified after a long course of study, both general and professional, and a thorough examination by a state board appointed for the
purpose. The right to practice law is in the nature of a franchise from the
state conferred only for merit. It cannot be assigned or inherited but must be
earned by hard study and good conduct. It is attested by a certificate of the
Supreme Court and is protected by registration. No one can practice law unless
he has taken an oath of office and has become an officer of the court, subject
to its discipline, liable to punishment for contempt in violating his duties as
such, and to suspension or removal. It is not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by
statute and the rules of the courts. As these conditions cannot be performed
by a corporation, it follows that the practice of law is not a lawful business for
a corporation to engage in. As it cannot practice law directly, it cannot indirectly by employing competent lawyers 0to practice for it, as that would be an
evasion which the law. will not tolerate."
The court made it clear that since the corporation could not' practice
law directly, it could not do so indirectly by hiring competent lawyers to
practice for it, since that would be an evasion which the law will not
tolerate, saying:
"A corporation can neither practice law nor hire lawyers to carry on the
business of practicing law for it any more than it can practice medicine or
dentistry by hiring doctors or dentists to act for it. (People v. Woodbury
Dermatological Institute, 192 N. Y. 454; Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 167
N. Y. 244, 246.) The legislature in authorizing the formation of corporations to
carry on 'any lawful business' did not intend to include the work of the learned
6.
L.J.,
7.
8.
9.

State v. Bailey Dental Co., 211 Iowa 731, 234 N. W. 260 (1931); see Editorial, N.Y.
April 22, 1931, at 424.
See State v. Bailey Dental Co., 211 Iowa 781, 785, 234 N. W. 260, 262 (1931).
Matter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910).
Id. at 483, 92 N. E. at 16.
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professions. Such an innovation with the evil results that might follow would
require the use of specific language dearly indicating the intention." 10
The theory underlying the court's point of view is that the Bar would
be "degraded" if its members became subject to the orders of a corporation, but it was conceded that this would be limited to those cases where
the corporation was in the business of conducting litigation for others,
not in conducting litigation for itself or its affiliates. Ringing words, but
corpora ficta nevertheless kept on entering the citadel.' Judge Vann,
in brief, was the Captain of the Gate.
In 1919 it was held that a corporation which, without giving any
advice leading to and consummated therein, prepared a bill of sale and
chattel mortgage by filling out blanks upon and in accordance with the
specific direction of a customer, is not rendering legal service or holding
itself out as entitled to practice law.' In that case the Court of Special
Sessions had convicted the defendant, a title company, of a violation of
the Penal Law by practicing law without a license. The Appellate
Division, Second Department, affirmed the judgment of conviction, but
the Court of Appeals, by a bench divided four to three, reversed the
conviction, chiefly on the ground that the corporation did not hold
itself out as preparing legal instruments generally "but only in connection with its legitimate business." Cardozo, J., with whom two other
judges agreed, believed that there was evidence before the triers of the
facts sufficient to sustain the finding of a violation of the law. The
present Chief Justice of the United States was the successful counsel for
the corporation.
In the next year the Court of Special Sessions convicted a corporation
of practicing law in violation of the Penal Law. Briefly, the facts were
that the corporation had drawn a contract of sale and a deed and
mortgage of real estate. Also, one of its employees had advised the
purchaser of the real estate that a street was to be opened through the
property, that there would be a certain cost on the owner of the property, and that the vendor of the real estate should bear the cost and
assessment. The corporation urged, on appeal, that these instruments
were drawn as part of the examination and insurance of the real estate
to be covered by the corporation's title policies, and that therefore it constituted no violation of the law. The People argued that the work was
distinct from the searching and insuring of title to real estate and that
10. Id. at 484, 92 N. E. at 16.
11. Woansa, FRAN/sThXN INCOpoRATm (1931) 164-166.
12. People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N. Y. 366, 125 N. E. 666 (1919), rev'g,

180 App. Div. 648, 168 N. Y. Supp. 278 (2d Dep't 1917); see also Jackson and Calloway,
Thte Relationship of the Bar to Corporate Fidixiaries (1932) 1 Bnooxv.x L. Rm. 37-63;
Editorial, The Domain of the Bar, Westchester L. J., July 22, 1932, at 2.
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"the corporation, through its employees, assumed to go beyond its
chartered powers and advise laymen on important, intricate, legal matters which should be left to lawyers, responsible to their individual clients,
and moved by no other interest." The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the judgment of conviction and dismissed the information, writing a short opinion by Putnam, J., who ruled that acts
incidental to its business are held to be lawful for the corporation."
Kelly, J. wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, stating bluntly that the
salutary provisions of the Penal Law forbidding the, practice of law by
corporations, were being emasculated. He said, in part:
"Unless we are to emasculate the salutary provisions of section 280 of the
Penal Law, I think we should hold that this corporation was prohibited from
doing the work described in the evidence, and that such work was outside its
chartered powers. I see no more reason for extending the exceptions in the
statute than in the case of unlawful practice of medicine, or violations of any
of the statutes enacted for the protection of the public against unlicensed
transactions.'

14

The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the Appellate Division without opinion.' 5
Whether the work involved in this case was legal service, which should
be performed only by a lawyer employed by and in touch with his client,
having only his client's individual rights and interests in mind and at
heart, is a close and debatable question. The answer depends considerably upon whose particular type of philosophy one favors: The business
man's approach, in terms of cost, efficiency and speed; or the lawyer's
approach, in terms of fiduciary trust, ethics and personal responsibility. "The worst injustices and frauds," it has been said aptly by
high authority, "take place beneath the obscurity of the common name
of a corporative firm."' 6 That a corporation, however, may employ
lawyers to perform legal work necessary to its main business, is undeniable, and therefore the view of the court may be defended, in addition to
being supported by the "state of things as they are."' 7
The New York courts have held that a corporation cannot practice
13. People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 191 App. Div. 165, 181 N. Y. Supp. 52
(2d Dep't 1920).
14. Id. at 170, 181 N. Y. Supp. at 56.
15. 230 N. Y. 578, 130 N. E. 901 (1920); see Comment (1920) 6 CoiR. L. Q. 108. As
to what has been determined to constitute law practice, see Legis. (1917) 17 CoL. L. Rav. 88;
(1918) 31 HAav. L. Rav. 886; (1931) 79 U. or PA. L. Rav. 96; Hicks and Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Agencies (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 48.

16.

Address, Very Rev. Aloysius J. Hogan, S.J., at Second Annual Red Mass of

Catholic Lawyers' Guild of Brooklyn, Oct. 5, 1935.
17. A suggestive discussion is presented in 1 LErUaS ox LEGAL Topics (1924)
delivered before the Assotiation of the Bar of the City of New York.

547,
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medicine, either directly or indirectly 1 8 The Woodbury Dermatological
Institute, a corporation which advertised to practice medicine, was convicted under the provisions of a statute declaring that "any person not
registered as a physician who shall advertise to practice medicine shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor."' 19 And the Siegel-Cooper Company, a
corporation, was held to be acting illegally in assuming to carry on in its
business the practice of dentistry in a large department store which it
was conducting in the City of New York.'0 These decisions find ample
support in public policy. But it is doubtful whether a corporation rests
under any inherent inability or disability to practice the professions.
Several decisions, while forbidding the corporate practice of medicine in
Nebraska, do not extend the prohibition to the employment of physicians
to perform the professional labors for the corporation. 2 ' And corporations have been allowed to engage in pharmacy, dentistry, architecture
and plumbing in a number of American states, provided their active
agent possesses a license. 2 While distasteful from the lawyer's standpoint, there is no inherent logical reason why a corporation cannot carry
on the practice of a profession. If a corporation can commit crimes, even
the most personal crimes, such as grand larceny and manslaughter; if
it can commit torts, even those in which a malicious intent is involved,
such as libel or malicious prosecution; if a corporation can enter into the
most complex and elaborate agreements, there seems no basic, logical
obstacle to the practice of a profession by a corporation, through its
competent licensed agents. The crux of the problem is whether corporations should be excluded from such professions, not so much because of
any inherent inability, but rather upon considerations of sound policy
and the general welfare.'
In recent years a number of appellate courts, chiefly in the south
and west, have taken a very emphatic position against corporate practice
of law, including not merely the conduct of cases in courts, but the
preparation of pleadings and other papers, conveyancing, the drafting
of legal instruments of all kinds, and in general all advice to clients
and action taken for them in matters requiring the use of any degree
18. People v. Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 192 N. Y. 454, 85 N. E. 697 (1903);
cf. State Electro-Aledical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N. W. 1078 (1905); State
Electro Medical Institute v. Platner, 74 Neb. 23, 103 N. W. 1079 (1905).
19. People v. Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 192 N. Y. 454, 8S N. E. 697 (1903).
20. Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 167 N. Y. 244, 60 N. E. 597, 52 L. R. A. 429 (1901).
21. State Electro-Mledical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N. W. 1078 (1905); State
Electro-Medical.Institute v. Platner, 74 Neb. 23, 103 N. W. 1079 (1905); Comment (1931)
44 HARe. L. REV. 1114-1116.

22. See, for example, Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105 (1928); People v. Allied
Architects Ass'n, 201 Cal. 428, 257 Pac. S11 (1927); Standard Oil Co. v. Commonwealth,
107 Ky. 606, 55 S.W. 8 (1900).
23. WoaRsaa, FRAxNNsTEiN INCOR.PORATED (1931) 163-164.
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of legal knowledge or skill. In Illinois the Supreme Court held, in 1931,
that a banking corporation, the Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, was
guilty of the illegal practice of law, and it was punished for contempt of
the Supreme Court in so engaging, was enjoined from continuing such
practice and was fined in the sum of $1,000 and costs. The Bank bad
conducted proceedings on behalf of its customers in the various courts
of the state, under the cloak of licensed attorneys who were its regular
employees. The Bank examined titles and rendered opinions thereon,
prepared and attended to the execution of wills, performed the legal
services necessary in the administration of estates, prepared numerous
legal documents, including contracts, mortgages and leases, for which
it charged and collected fees, and furnished incidental legal advice in
connection therewith. In brief, the Bank appears to have carried on the
general practice of law with the exception of domestic relations cases.
The Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association
brought an original proceeding in the Supreme Court against the Bank,
which resulted in the order of contempt and fine above mentioned. The
court stated, in effect, that the fine was so moderate because it was "the
first time" the courts had been called upon to decide the issues involved.
Orr, J., said, in part:
"As stated above, this court has inherent power and control over the general
subject of the practice of law, and this includes the power to punish unauthorized persons for presuming to practice law without being licensed so to do
by this court. Respondent is a corporation. It has not been and can not 'be
licensed or permitted by this court to practice law (In re Co-operative Law
Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15).

A corporation can neither practice law nor

hire lawyers to carry on the business of practicing law for it (People v. California Protective Corp'n, 76 Cal. App. 354, 244 Pac. 1089). The right to
practice law attaches to the individual and dies with him. It can not be made
the subject of business to be sheltered under the cloak of a corporation having
marketable shares descendible under the laws of inheritance (State v. Merchants'
Protective Corp'n, 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694; People v. Merchant's Protective
Corp'n, 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363). In the case of In re Otterness (recently
decided), the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a corporation can not itself
practice law, nor can it lawfully do so by hiring an attorney to conduct a
general law practice for others for pay, where the fees earned are to be, and are,
received as income and profit by the corporation (232 N. W. 318). Likewise
the Court of Appeals in Ohio has lately decided that, although not prohibited
by criminal statute, it is unlawful for a corporation to practice law or maintain
a legal department or hire attorneys and advertise their services for the use of
others (Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n, 34 Ohio Law Bulletin, p.
234, decided March 9, 1931). .124
24. People ex rel. Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,
474, 176 N. E. 901, 906 (1931).
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In 1934 the Supreme Court of Ohio rendered a similar decision, concluding its opinion by saying: " ...the right to practice law conferred by
the state is a special privilege in the nature of a franchise and a possessor
thereof may be protected by injunction from the invasion of the right
thus vested in him.' 5 The highest court of Georgia in 1932 squarely
denied the eligibility of corporations to practice law in any manner,
though doubtless this would be subject to the implied condition that the
corporation could practice law in its own business, on its own behalf, or
that of its affiliates and subsidiaries.2 Hines, J., writing for the Georgia
bench said:
"Any person who does not comply with the foregoing requirements and does
not take the oath required, can not be licensed to practice law in this State.
It is manifest from these provisions of the law that no corporation can be
licensed to practice law in this State. No corporation can comply with the
requirements which are imposed upon applicants as prerequisites to enable them
to obtain license to practice law.
"This proposition is sustained by the great weight, if not by all, the decisions
of the courts of other States in this country. These decisions deny the eligibility
of corporations to practice law. Ruling Case Law states the proposition thus:
'Since, as has been seen, the practice of law is not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by
statute and the rules of the courts, and as these conditions can not be performed by a corporation, it follows that the practice of law is notT a lawful
business for a corporation to engage in? 2 R.C.L. 946, section 13.?2
In a recent Idaho decision a trust company advertised broadcast that
it drew contracts, wills, mortgages, deeds and similar instruments. It
published a pamphlet "How to Conserve your Estate" in which it said,
"We make a business of advising in all such matters and are specialists
in drawing trust agreements, declarations of trust, and wills. We make
no charge for consultations. Come and see us if interested." The
corporation was held to be engaged in the illegal practice of law.p In a
Minnesota case in 1930 a disciplinary proceeding was instituted against
an attorney. - He had been engaged by a bank on a fixed salary and
agreed to turn over to it all fees earned by him in matters handled both
for the bank and for others. The court stated that a corporation, of
course, may employ an attorney to conduct its own legal business, but
that an arrangement of the above type was illegal, stating that for the
bank to employ the lawyer to conduct law business generally for others,
25.

Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 35, 193 N. E. 650,

655 (1934).
26. Boykin, Solicitor-General v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S. E. 796 (1932).
27. Id. at 521, 162 S.E. at 800.
28. In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 2S0, 288 Pac. 157 (1930).
29. In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N. W. 318 (1930).
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for the benefit and profit of the bank, was misconduct both on the part of
the bank and the lawyer, and amounted to unlawful practice of the law.
Two or three very recent cases in Illinois deserve careful attention.
Whether some of them go too far and prove too much presents a neat
problem. In People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club,"0
decided October 14, 1935, re-hearing denied December 5, 1935, a motor
club, organized as a corporation not for pecuniary profit, offered legal
services to its own members, with a statement that in case of a member's
arrest for alleged violation of the motor vehicle law, the member could
call upon the legal department of the Motor Club, which thereupon
would conduct his defense. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the
Motor Club was improperly engaged in the practice of the law and in
the illegal business of hiring lawyers to "practice law" for its members.
The court stated that the Club could neither practice law nor hire
lawyers to carry on the business of practicing law for it. The corporation was found guilty of contempt of court and fined $1,000 and the
costs of the suit, and was permanently restrained from engaging in such
practice. Two justices dissented. The opinion, by Orr, J., who also
-wrote the opinion in the Peoples Stock Yards Bank case, stated the conclusions of the Bench as follows:
"However beneficial its many other purposes and services seem to be to its
members and to the public generally, we cannot condone the advertisements
and solicitations of memberships by respondent and its admission that it was
only acting as agent in rendering legal services for its members without abandoning the rules laid down in several recent cases governing such practices. While
the case of People v. Peoples Stock Yards Bank, 344 Ill. 462, is distinguishable
from the present case in many respects, yet the fundamental principle was there
expressed that 'a corporation can neither practice law nor hire lawyers to carry
on the business of practicing law for it.' When the Chicago Motor Club offered
legal services to its members with the statement, 'should you be arrested for an
alleged violation of the Motor Vehicle law, you may call the legal department,
and one of our attorneys will conduct your defense in court,' it was engaging in
the business of hiring lawyers to practice law for its members. This we have
repeatedly condemned in Illinois. People v. Peoples Stock Yards Bank, supra;

People v. Motorists Ass'n, 354 Ill. 595; People v. Real Estate Taxpayers, 354
id. 102. Other jurisdictions have reached the same or similar conclusions in
recent cases. Goodman v. Motorists Alliance, 29 Ohio N.P.R. 31; In re Morse,
98 Vt. 85, 126 AtI. 550; In re Opinion of the Justices, 194 N.E. (Mass.) 313;

Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 179 Ati. (R.I.) 139, decided May 9, 1935. The fact that respondent was a corporation organized not
for profit does not vary the rule. People v. Real Estate Taxpayers, supra.
"Legal services cannot be capitalized for the profit of laymen, corporate or
30. 199 N. E. 1 (I1. 1935). There is no danger of self-interest or divided loyalty In
cases of this type. The layman argues that such an earnest endeavor to lessen legal expenditure should be encouraged, not discouraged and forbidden.
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otherwise, directly or indirectly, in this State. In practically every jurisdiction
where the issue has been raised it has been held that the public welfare demands that legal services should not be commercialized, and that no corporation, association or partnership of laymen can contract with its members to
supply them with legal services, as if that service were a commodity which
could be advertised, bought, sold and delivered. The present case offers no
exception to the rule, notwithstanding the other beneficial services rendered by
respondent to its members and to the public generally."31
This opinion has been quoted at some length because it has been
earnestly urged, particularly by laymen, that the extension of the orthodox rule to non-profit corporations hiring lawyers to advise and assist
their own members, is unjustified. The peril of self-interest and of
direct conflict of interests certainly is absent in these cases.
In People v. Securities Discount Corp.,- decided in 1935, a corporation was engaged in the collection of claims for physicians. There were
sham assignments of the claims from them to the corporation. The suits
were brought in the corporate name. The corporation was adjudged in
contempt and fined $250. It was said: "Courts have the inherent power
to punish for contempt those practicing before them without a license."
In Winberry v. Hallian decided in Illinois in the same year, it was held
that the state may deny the corporation the right to practice the professions and may insist upon the personal obligations of individual
practitioners, even though contracts and investments have been made
and entered into by existing corporations engaged in such practice. The
court relied on the exercise of the "police power" of the state in reaching
these conclusions, and cited with approval the Woodbury case in New
York. 4
The foregoing decisions, and there are many others, seem to rest upon
the basis that corporations, which are invisible, intangible, soulless entities, existing only in contemplation of the law, should not be permitted
to do that which individual practitioners can do as well. Much justification there is for that outlook where the corporation is acting not on its
own business, or in its own behalf, or in behalf of its affiliates, or subsidiaries, but on behalf of rank outsiders, conducting a general law practice. Furthermore, some courts particularly in the south and west, appear to have been impressed by the views of Woodrow Wilson and
Justice Brandeis, who predicted years ago that the individual would be
engulfed by the corporation unless remedial steps promptly were taken0 5
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
(1935).

Id. at 3.
361 flL 551, 198 N. E. 681 (1935).
361 III. 121, 197 N. E. 552 (1935).
People v. Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 192 N. Y. 454, 85 N. E. 697 (190S).
FPAuxxEL, T~m CuRSE or BIGnEss, M rscELLANous PAPms or Bin. Jusncz BAmmms
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And Calvin Coolidge, a type of mind quite different, also realized the
marked social trend, which he thought unfortunate, to oust the lawyer
and to substitute some other organization in his place, for example, the
corporation.
Despite the rulings of the courts in the cases which have been discussed, it cannot be denied that there exists a powerful sentiment among
laymen in favor of the performance by corporations of many kinds of
legal services which are regarded as within the lawyers' licit domain.
In certain types of easily standardized legal work, such as the preparation of simple legal documents, the business man feels the superiority
of the corporation. The community seemingly approves of drafting
of legal papers by title and trust companies, real estate offices, and
banks. It sanctions the everyday method of incorporation through large
companies employed for that purpose, rather than through lawyers or
law firms. The business man feels that there are economies in the
large-scale management and organization of corporations." The lawyer
objects to the corporation as a receiver or trustee, which is natural
enough; but the layman seems to feel that it can do such work more
efficiently and cheaply. Indeed, in California, a bill directed against the
handling of estates by trust companies was defeated at a popular referendum . 7 There is no denying, too, that the layman, rightly or wrongly,
seems to feel that the lawyer is often careless and irresponsible. This
critical attitude on the layman's part doubtless is largely unjustified.
But who can deny that it exists?
A favorite modern poet3 has said: "A hearse horse snickers hauling
a lawyer's bones." And of course corporations have no bones. Nor are
they in need of hearses. And they can and do advertise their legal immortality and responsibility. So, whether or not this critical attitude
on the part of business men is justified-I, for one, think it is not-there
can be no doubt it exists. The Chicago Tribune, a representative newspaper, in commenting upon the proceeding brought by the Illinois and
Chicago Bar Associations against the Peoples Stock Yards State Bank,
above referred to, said editorially:30
"The petition is interesting as revealing the somewhat antiquated attitude of
the Bar Association, if not of all lawyers, toward their profession. The attitude
is not shared outside their profession. The ordinary man feels, and rightly,
that he is in better hands when dealing with an established bank than in going
to some lawyer with whom he is acquainted, or to whom he has been recommended. We believe the public interest would be served if law firms were incorporated like other business establishments. In this way- the formation of
36.
37.
38.
39.

Shinn, How to Deal witl the Unlawful Practice of Law (1931) 17 A.B.A.J. 98.
(1922) 8 A.BA.J. 799.
Carl Sandburg.
See Bundick, loc. cit. supra note 4.
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stable houses, with excellent traditions, would be encouraged, and the man in
need of legal services would be in a better way to get what he needs promptly
and at a cost commensurate with the service."
There can be no doubt that corporations possess many attractive
assets and advantages. Among them are vast organization on a giant
scale; the use of up-to-date business methods; the standardization of
certain types of legal work; their continuous and continuing legal life;
substantial business responsibility; wide connections and experience.
Furthermore, their contacts are superior to those possessed by the ordinary lawyer. The business man, therefore, usually prefers to deal with a
corporation rather than with an attorney, particularly where a close personal relationship is not really necessary. His point of view generally
is rather in favor of corporations as against private attorneys. This important social and economic factor cannot be overlooked in any consideration of the problem of the corporation in connection with the practice
of the law. 0 It has resulted, for better or worse, in a fait accompli.
Corporations, despite the classic words of the Captain of the Gate, have
carried the breastworks and are invading the lawyer's most intimate
domain. Spinoza believed that there never was any change, but a mere
casual glance at the factual situation today, so far as the corporate practice of law is concerned, at once reveals a striking dissimilarity from the
picture presented a generation ago. Any unbiased study of the conditions
surrounding the activities of corporations in our great cities will show that
their activities in the field of law practice constantly are increasing, that
the business man is not displeased with this new development, and that
in certain fields the application of their up-to-date commercial methods
has resulted in greater efficiency and economy.
The facts, as they are, should be recognized frankly. To deny them
is naive and foolish. That this new social and economic development
can be frustrated is highly doubtful. The most sensible method of dealing with the fait accompli is to recognize it as a concrete condition and
to abandon theoretical discussion, which after all gets one nowhere.
"The tree has grown as we know it. The practical question is what is
to be the next organic step." 4'
It is my judgment that this next step should be to impose on corporations, engaged directly or indirectly in the practice of law, the identical
requirements which are now imposed on individual lawyers.
The late Charles A. Boston aptly suggested that the bar associations
also can enforce the same code of ethics against the lawyer-employee of
the corporation, as against the private lawyer.- Corporations engaged
(1931) 171-172, 177-179.
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in legal activities should be forbidden to advertise or to solicit this phase
of their business by any method no matter how subtle. The employees
of such corporations must be made to observe the Canons of Ethics, for
their obligations are the same as those of an individual practitioner. If
a corporation, through its agents and servants, persists in wrongful practices, contrary to the ethics of the legal profession and in refusing to
abide by the requirements imposed on lawyers, the state may bring a
proceeding in quo warranto to oust the corporation or secure its dissolution.4 3 It should not prove difficult to devise precise limitations of corporate propriety according to accepted standards. Indeed, this has already been accomplished in large measure, so far as the actions of
corporate fiduciaries are concerned.44 Such standards should be extended to every phase of law practice in which corporations are concerned. But to seek to exclude corporations entirely from the practice
of the law is idle, impractical, and adopts a too narrow view of the important business and social considerations which today are involved. To
seek to divorce the rules of law from the facts of our complex business
life of today is an act of folly. It is too late, by these many years, to
turn back the hands of time by adopting and seeking to enforce hard
and fast impractical prohibitions. It is more sensible, and wiser, to
impose upon corporations, so far as they are engaged in the practice of
law, the same requirements, standards and obligations of the moral
law and conscience, which are imposed on individual lawyers.
43. Cf. People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 24 N. E. 834 (1890);
State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N. E. 834 (1892).
44. Jackson, Unlawful Law Practice (1936) 8 N. Y. STATu BAR ASS'N BULL. 21, 23;
Bundick, supra note 4, at 7-9.

